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ANALYSING THE RELIABILITY OF
ACTUATION ELEMENTS IN SERIES AND
PARALLEL CONFIGURATIONS FOR HIGH
REDUNDANCY ACTUATION
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Abstract. A high redundancy actuator (HRA)
is an actuation system composed of a high num-
ber of actuation elements, increasing both travel
and force above the capability of an individual el-
ement. This approach provides inherent fault tol-
erance: if one of the elements fails, the capabili-
ties of the whole actuator may be reduced, but it
retains core functionality. Many different configu-
rations are possible, with different implications for
the actuator capability and reliability. This paper
analyses the reliability of the HRA based on the
likelihood of an unacceptable reduction in capabil-
ity. The analysis of the HRA is a highly structured
problem, but it does not fit into known reliability
categories (such as the k-out-of-n system), and a
fault tree analysis becomes prohibitively large. In-
stead, a multi-state systems approach is pursued
here, which provides an easy, concise and efficient
reliability analysis of the HRA. The resulting prob-
ability distribution can be used to find the optimal
configuration of an HRA for a given set of require-
ments.
Keywords: redundancy, mechanical actuation,
bionics, high redundancy actuator (HRA), fault-
tolerance, multi-state system.
Note: this is the authors' draft - the final ver-
sion is available from Taylor & Francis.
1. Introduction
1.1. Fault Tolerance. Fault tolerance is about dealing with
faults in technical systems (Blanke et al., 2006). Its goal is to
prevent a component fault from becoming a system failure
(Blanke et al., 2001). So far, most theoretical considerations
have focused on sensor faults. If a sensor signal is incorrect,
the faulty signal can be ignored, and a redundant sensor can
be used instead with minimal effect on the system. There-
fore redundant sensors are very effective at reducing the
probability of a fault affecting the system function (Frank,
1990).
Actuators however can fail in several different ways or
fault modes, and the resulting effect on the system cannot
be ignored. For instance, a valve blocked in the closed po-
sition can be tolerated by means of opening a redundant
valve in parallel. However, if a valve is blocked in the open
position, a parallel redundancy cannot be used to compen-
sate, because a valve connected in series needs to be closed.
Therefore, the actuator redundancy has to be studied for
a network of actuators, and the expected fault modes are
highly important.
Practical approaches to fault tolerant actuation ignore
the different fault modes. In a typical application, 2, 3 or
4 actuators are used in parallel, very much like redundant
sensors. Each actuator is strong enough to meet the per-
formance requirements by itself, and the impact of some
failed actuators on the system is considered negligible. This
means in the valve example above that for instance some
valves blocked in the closed position are accounted for by
the parallel configuration, but valves blocked in the open po-
sition have to be prevented by additional, specific measures.
If the valves are connected in series, the opposite applies:
valves blocked open are ok, but valves blocked close break
the system. Either way, the result is a system with a signif-
icant amount of over-engineering, because many times the
required actuation power needs to be installed.
Practical approaches to fault tolerant actuation ignore
the different fault modes. In a typical application, 2, 3 or
4 actuators are used in parallel, very much like redundant
sensors. Each actuator is strong enough to meet the per-
formance requirements by itself, and the impact of some
failed actuators on the system is considered negligible. This
means a loss of force fault is accounted for, but a solid lock-
up of an actuator has to be prevented by specific structural
measures. The result is a system with a significant amount
of over-engineering, because many times the required actu-
ation power needs to be installed.
The scientific literature also struggles with the distinct
implications of actuator faults, with most approaches still
based on an information view more suitable for the han-
dling of sensor faults. Recent examples include the exten-
sion of the observer-based approach to cover actuator faults
in the form of the virtual actuator (Steffen, 2005), and the
exploitation of analytical redundancies in the form of dy-
namic gain scheduling and control allocation (Oppenheimer
and Doman, 2006).
1.2. High Redundancy Actuator. The obvious way to
improve reliability is to use a greater number of actuation
elements. To reduce the over-dimensioning involved in this,
it is possible to reduce the size and strength of elements,
while retaining a reliability advantage. For example, a sys-
tem with ten elements may still work with only eight of them
operational, and the reliability improves because two faults
can be accommodated. The overall capacity is only over-
dimensioned by 25%. This is a significant improvement
over the use of two full-sized redundant actuators, which
leads to 100% over-dimensioning. The use of an optimal
Figure 1. High Redundancy Actuator
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number and size of elements is the central idea of the high
redundancy actuator (HRA).
The HRA is inspired by one of nature's answers to fault
tolerant actuation: the muscle. It is composed of many in-
dividual fibres, each of which provides only a minute contri-
bution to the force and the travel of the muscle. This allows
the muscle as a whole to be highly resilient to damage of
individual fibres. In this sense the HRA is a bionic system,
because it is inspired by an existing biological solution.
Traditionally, only parallel aggregation is used, which
makes the system resilient towards loss of force, but not
with respect to lock-up faults (see Figure 2). Series aggre-
gation could be used to address lock-up faults, but it does
not help with loss of force faults. The HRA is a synthesis
of both aggregations, with actuation elements being used
both in parallel and in series (see Figure 1). This increases
the available travel and force over the capability of an indi-
vidual element, and it makes the actuator resilient to faults
where an element becomes loose or locked up. These faults
will reduce the overall capability, but they do not render the
assembly functionless, and they do not require a change of
the control structure as proposed by Jiang et al. (2010).
Initial research has focused on the modelling and control
of simple configurations with four elements (Du et al., 2006,
2007). Previous studies on the reliability of electromechani-
cal assemblies are rare: the reliability of electro-mechanical
steering is discussed by Blanke and Thomsen (2006), and
electrical machines and power electronics are analysed by
Ribeiro et al. (2004). Neither of these consider the combi-
nation of both series and parallel structures together in a
single actuator.
This paper presents a method to analyse the reliability
of an HRA of any size, as long as it can be interpreted as
a hierarchy of parallel and series configurations. The diffi-
culty with analysing an HRA is that many faults can oc-
cur simultaneously, and the system may still be functional.
Conventional methods of reliability analysis (binary fault
trees, event trees, stochastic automata etc) suffer from an
extreme increase of complexity. The number of cut sets
increases exponentially with the system size, and this ren-
ders the analysis unmanageable even for reasonably small
systems such as a configuration of 10× 10 elements.
The approach presented here is loosely based on the con-
cepts developed using graph theory in Steffen et al. (2007,
2008). It avoids the issue of complexity by using a multi-
state system abstraction as used by Jenab and Dhillon (2006)
that is independent of the temporal dimension of the prob-
lem. Using the principle of divide and conquer, the system
is decomposed level by level, relying on simple aggregation
laws of low computational complexity. The basic idea was
introduced in Steffen et al. (2009), and it is presented here in
a much more thorough and comprehensive treatment. The
approach is applied to different 4×4 configurations for com-
parison, generalised results are proven about the relative
advantages and disadvantages of one configuration over an-
other of the same size, and a discussion of the computational
complexity of this approach is included.
1.3. List of Symbols. This paper follows the notation used
in the first part of Pham (2003), supplemented by the appli-
cation specific interpretation of the capability c. This leads
to the following symbols.
Symbol Meaning
P (·) probability of an event
q failure probability (unreliability) of an
element, typically close to 0
p reliability of an element, typically close
to 1
c generic capability, normalised (1 for a
single element)
c vector of capabilities for several ele-
ments
ct travel (or velocity) capability
cf force capability
n! factorial of n, n! =
∏
i=1...n i(
i
n
)
binomial i over n,
(
i
n
)
= i!n!(n−i)!
x a system configuration x ∈ {S,P}k with
size k
rx(c) probability of capability c of system x:
rx(c) = P (cx = c)
Rx(c) reliability of system x wrt. the require-
ment c, R(c) = P (cx ≥ c)
Rfx(cf ) reliability of x wrt. the force require-
ment cf
Rtx(ct) reliability of x wrt. the travel require-
ment ct
Rftx(cf , ct) reliability of x wrt. force requirement
cf and travel requirement ct
1.4. Structure of the Paper. Section 2 deals with the ba-
sic terms and concepts used for the reliability assessment,
and it defines the behaviour of individual actuation ele-
ments. In Section 3, the effect of series or parallel arrange-
ment of elements on reliability is investigated. In Section 4,
the special cases of series-in-parallel and parallel-in-series
configurations are analysed for a simple 2 × 2 system. In
Section 6, this concept is extended to configurations with
multiple layers, and an exhaustive study of 4 × 4 systems
is presented. Section 7 contains further remarks and com-
parative properties of different configurations. The paper
finishes with some conclusions in Section 9.
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(a) nominal (b) loose fault (c) lock-up fault
Figure 3. A Single Actuation Element
Table 1. Influence of Faults on Capabilities
Fault Force Travel Probability
Capability Capability
None nominal (1) nominal (1) pfpt
Loose affected (0) nominal (1) qfpt
Lock-Up nominal (1) affected (0) pfqt
Both affected (0) affected (0) qfqt
2. Specification of Actuation Elements
The individual actuation elements of the HRA are speci-
fied using a number of different measures. From an abstract
perspective, they can be divided into two types: physical
measures and reliability measures. The first kind contains
physical parameters related to the mechanical movement,
such as force, speed, acceleration, or distance. The second
type of parameters describes the probability of a fault.
2.1. Specification of the Nominal Performance. An
actuation element can perform a one-dimensional mechan-
ical movement (expansion or contraction) in response to a
control input as shown in Figure 3a. To simplify the anal-
ysis, only the static case is considered in the following. So
the central performance measurements of an element are
the force f it can produce and the amount of travel t it can
provide.
These two basic functions are called force and travel ca-
pability. It is used consistently to describe both the prop-
erties of an individual element as well as the properties of a
combination of elements.
While it is entirely possible to measure the capabilities
in physical units (Newton for the force and meter for the
travel), this paper will use normalised values instead. The
force capability cf and travel capability ct of a nominal el-
ement are defined to be one (without unit). This simplifies
the notation significantly, and when necessary, the discrete
numbers can easily be converted back into physical units.
In principle, it is possible to describe the capabilities with
continuous values, and to use continuous probability distri-
butions to describe them. However, that approach is more
suitable for analysing the effect of small manufacturing devi-
ations between elements than the effect of significant faults.
2.2. Specification of Faults. The two capability measures
lead to two main fault modes of an element: loss of force
(loose fault, see Figure 3b) and loss of travel (lock-up fault,
see Figure 3c). Both faults are assumed to be total: a fault
reduces the relevant capability to zero (see Table 1 and Fig-
ure 4).
For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that both fault
modes (loose and lock-up) are independent. This implies
Figure 4. Two-Dimensional Capability
Space by Fault States
Table 2. Two-Dimensional State Probabilities
cf = 0 cf = 1
ct = 0 qfqt pfqt
ct = 1 qfpt pfpt
that they can also appear together, which may seem impos-
sible at first. However, this analysis is concerned with the
guaranteed performance of an element, and it is possible an
element fails to deliver force in one situation and travel in
another, so that in effect it cannot reliably provide either
capability.
In applications where both fault modes are exclusive, a
small error is made by these assumptions. Ways to reduce
and bound this error will be discussed in Section 5.
It is also assumed that a locked-up element is fixed in
its neutral position (this would be the medium length if the
nominal travel is symmetric to both sides). This assumption
is for convenience only and can be relaxed later.
2.3. Specification of Reliability. In practical applications,
different ways can be used to describe the reliability of an
element, such as mean time to failure (MTTF), availability,
failure probability over a given time, or failure probability
during a specified mission. The relevant specification de-
pends very much on the application. However, all measures
are based on probabilities or probability densities over time.
These functions over time can be interpreted using any of
the above measures. Therefore, this paper will use fault
probabilities as a generic way to measure reliability:
P (loose) = P (cf = 0) = qf
P (lock-up) = P (ct = 0) = qt .
2.4. Capability Distributions. Together with the corre-
sponding OK-probability P (cf = 1) = pf = 1 − qf and
P (ct = 1) = pt = 1 − qt, these values define the two capa-
bility distributions
rf (i) = P (cf = i)
rt(j) = P (ct = j) ,
where i and j are non-negative integer values representing
the force and travel capability under consideration. Because
there are two capabilities, the state space is two-dimensional
as shown in Table 2. However, to avoid the complexity of
two-dimensional distributions, this paper deals with one ca-
pability at a time. This separation is possible because both
fault modes are assumed to be statistically independent.
4 THOMAS STEFFEN, FRANK SCHILLER, MICHAEL BLUM, AND ROGER DIXON
(a) parallel (b) series (c) 2x2 PS (d) 2x2 SP
Figure 5. Basic Configurations
Table 3. Configurations and Capabilities
Configuration Force Capability Travel Capability
Parallel increased (sum) limited (min)
Series limited (min) increased (sum)
Grid increased increased
(times columns) (times rows)
In some cases, the cumulative capability distributions
Rf (i) = P (cf ≥ i) =
cf,max∑
k=i
P (cf = k) =
cf,max∑
k=i
rf (k)
Rt(j) = P (ct ≥ j) =
ct,max∑
k=j
P (ct = k) =
ct,max∑
k=j
rt(k)
are used for determining the reliability of more complex
configurations.
As more elements are used together, the capability in-
creases, and the distributions extend to higher values. The
reliability can be determined from the distribution by look-
ing up the required performance of the system. This notion
of capabilities was developed in Steffen et al. (2007), but
the concept of a capability distribution is new.
3. Aggregation on a Single Level
The main reason for using several elements is that they
serve to increase the capabilities (see Figure 5 and Table 1).
Two elements in parallel can produce twice the force, and
two elements in series can achieve twice the travel. In the
following, it is assumed that n equal elements are combined,
and that the capability distribution for one individual ele-
ment is known.1
3.1. Limiting Capabilities. Some capabilities do not in-
crease when subsystems are combined. Instead, the capa-
bility of the resulting system is determined by the weakest
part. This happens e.g. with the force capability cf for
1The same basic laws of aggregating capabilities are also applicable
in many other areas. Reliable rotary actuation can be achieved with
velocity and torque adding gears, for example. Electrical systems deal
with the dual variables of voltage and current, and series and paral-
lel configuration are commonly used in IGBT (insulated gate bipo-
lar transistor) high power switching devices (Shammas et al., 2006).
Transportation systems and communication networks also have corre-
sponding relations governing throughput and latency. From a reliabil-
ity perspective, all these systems are essentially identical in that they
use series and parallel configurations to increase two dual capabilities
of primary concern.
actuation elements used in series (see Figure 5b)
(1) cfS(cf ) = min{cf1, cf2} ,
where cf denotes the vector (cf1 cf2)
T . The same equation
also applies to the travel capability of elements in parallel
(2) ctP(ct) = min{ct1, ct2}
(see Figure 5a). These equations follow directly from the
specification and physical laws, so they will be assumed as
given for the reliability analysis.
In both cases, the capability of such a combined system is
the minimum capability over all the subsystems or elements:
(3) clim(c) = min{c1, . . . , cn} .
This represents a classic series arrangement of multi-state
subsystems (MSS), and the reliability has been well studied
in the literature. Here, a new operator is introduced to
calculate the new cumulative reliability distribution for the
overall system.
Theorem 1. If n elements with the cumulative reliability
distributions Ri(c) are connected so that the overall capabil-
ity is limited by the weakest element according to Eqn. (3),
the cumulative reliability distribution Rlim(clim) of the new
system can be calculated as
Rlim(c) = R1 ~R2 ~ . . .~Rn(c)(4)
with the operator
(5) (R1 ~R2)(c) = R1(c)R2(c) .
Proof. According to the definition, the reliability Rlim(c) is
the probability that the overall capability is at least c:
clim ≥ c .
Because of Eqn. (3), this inequality holds if and only if all
elements have at least this reliability:
∀i : ci ≥ c .
Since the capability of the elements ci are considered to be
independent, the probability of this condition can be calcu-
lated as the product of the probabilities of the individual
terms:
P (∀i : ci ≥ c) =
∏
i
P (ci ≥ c) =
∏
i
Ri(c) .
This is exactly the result defined by the operator ~. 
Since the original Eqn. (3) is applicable in two cases, the
same is true for the resulting operator ~. It can be used to
describe the force of elements in series
RfS = Rf1 ~Rf2(6)
or the travel for elements in parallel
RtP = Rt1 ~Rt2 .(7)
Remark 1. For a number of n identical elements R(c) =
Ri(c), the result can be simplified to
Rlim(c) = R1 ~R2 ~ . . .~Rn(c)(8)
= (R(c))n .(9)
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If the elements only have the states 0 and 1 (with probabil-
ities r(0) = q and r(1) = p = 1 − q), these results can be
simplified further to the following distribution:
rlim(0) = 1− pn(10)
rlim(1) = Rlim(1) = p
n .(11)
For many practical cases, it can be assumed that the prob-
ability of a fault q is small compared to the probability of
normal operation p. Using the assumption p ≈ 1, this dis-
tribution can be (conservatively) approximated as
rlim(0) ≈ nq(12)
rlim(1) ≈ 1− nq .(13)
3.2. Additive Capabilities. If several actuation elements
are used together, the capability of the combined system
may increase above the capability of any element. In fact,
this increase is the motivation for using several elements in
the first place.
In contrast to the minimum operator in Eqn. (1), the sum
applies to the force capability of two elements in parallel (see
Figure 5a),
(14) cfP(cf ) = cf1 + cf2
and to the travel capability of two elements in series (see
Figure 5b)
(15) ctS(ct) = ct1 + ct2 .
In both cases, the relevant capabilities of the elements add
up to the capability of the overall system:
(16) cadd(c) = c1 + c2 + . . .+ cn .
Remark 2. This is unlike typical multi-state systems (Jenab
and Dhillon, 2006), because the state space of the system
cadd can be larger than the state space of any element ci.
So this specific case is not usually treated in the literature
on multi-state systems. A similar situation is discussed for
two-state systems in the k-out-of-n:G problem, but the k
(which corresponds to cadd) is considered given. This is dif-
ferent from the situation with the HRA, where a distribution
over k is sought, and therefore k is a variable.
Again, a new operator ⊕ is introduced to calculate the
cumulative reliability distribution of the combined system
of two elements.
Theorem 2. If n elements with cumulative reliability dis-
tributions Ri(ci) are arranged so that the capabilities add
up according to Eqn. (16), the cumulative reliability distri-
bution Radd(cadd) of the resulting system is defined by
(17) Radd(c) = R1 ⊕R2 ⊕ . . .⊕Rn(c)
with the operator
(18) (R1 ⊕R2)(c) =
c∑
i=0
(R1(i)−R1(i+ 1))R2(c− i) .
Proof. For this operator, it is easier to work with the re-
liability distribution r instead of the cumulative reliabil-
ity distribution R. Because only integer capabilities are
used, it follows from the definition of R and r that r(i) =
R(i)−R(i+ 1). Therefore, the following equation is equiv-
alent to (18):
(19) radd(c) =
c∑
i=0
r1(i)r2(c− i) .
Central to this proof is the set of all capability combinations
c1 and c2 that lead to the same overall capability cadd = c.
According to Eqn. (16), this set is
C(c) = {(c1, c2) ∈ N20 : c1 + c2 = c} .
The probability of the two elements to have the capabilities
(c1, c2) is
P (c1, c2) = P (c1)P (c2) = r1(c1)r2(c2)
because both are considered to be independent. Now the
probability of a given overall capability of c can be calcu-
lated as:
P (cadd = c) =
∑
(c1,c2)∈C(c)
P (c1)P (c2)
which is equivalent to Eqn. (19). 
This operator ⊕, too, is applicable in two situations: the
force of elements in parallel
RfP = Rf1 ⊕Rf2(20)
and the travel for elements in series
RtS = Rt1 ⊕Rt2 .(21)
By using this operator ⊕ together with the previous op-
erator ~ it is possible to express all possible aggregations of
force and travel via parallel or serial connections.
Remark 3. It is trivial to see that both operators satisfy
several basic properties of an algebraic addition such as com-
mutativity, associativity, and the zero and identity element.
The zero element is an element that is always so strong that
it never limits the overall system, while the identity element
delivers no capability at all. In fact, the underlying deter-
ministic calculations of capabilities using Eqns. (3) and (16)
form a max-plus algebra.
However, the two operators working with stochastic dis-
tributions do not satisfy the law of distributivity:
R1 ⊕R2 ~R1 ⊕R3 6= R1 ~ (R2 ⊕R3) .
This is caused by the initial assumption that all elements are
independent, even if modelled by the same reliability distri-
bution. So the same variable R1 is interpreted as referring
to different elements, which are nominally identically, but
subject to independent faults. This breaks the law of dis-
tributivity, so the two operators ~ and ⊕ do not form an
algebraic ring (see Heidergott et al., 2005). Ring properties
could be restored by using multidimensional distributions,
but the additional complexity is not warranted in this appli-
cation.
4. Hierarchical Aggregation
An HRA contains elements in series and in parallel. Thus
it is important to analyse the reliability resulting from mul-
tiple levels of aggregations. Assuming that the configuration
is given, this section explains how to find the reliability dis-
tribution of the overall system by combining the operators
defined above.
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Any structure can be analysed using an iterative bottom-
up approach. From the capability distribution of the indi-
vidual elements, it is possible to calculate the distributions
for the basic subsystems, which are either parallel or series
arrangements of elements. Basic subsystems can be aggre-
gated to more complex subsystems, and this can be repeated
until the reliability of the overall system is found.
For a successful application of this iterative approach, it
is required that the actuator configuration is described as a
series-parallel network. This is possible if the HRA can be
broken down into series and parallel configurations of sub-
systems, until the level of individual actuation elements is
reached. Not all networks satisfy this condition (a detailed
analysis is beyond the scope of this paper). In electrical
networks, star-triangle conversion is typically used to solve
this problem. This is not feasible for the stochastic anal-
ysis, because the one-to-one correspondence between faults
and elements is lost. Fortunately, non series-parallel net-
works are rare in mechanical engineering, and an analysis
of typical sample configurations has shown that they offer
no advantage in terms of reliability, weight or cost.
4.1. Notation and Formalism. For the examples used
here, it is assumed that two equal subsystems are used in
series or in parallel. A series configuration of two elements
is denoted with the letter S, and the parallel configuration
with the letter P (cf. Section 3). A sequence of letters de-
notes a hierarchical configuration, from the bottom level of
aggregating individual elements up to the complete system.
So two series elements, duplicated in parallel, are called
SP. The dual configuration (two parallel elements, and two
of these blocks arranged in series) is denoted as PS. Using
two SP systems in series leads to an SPS configuration and
so on. It is also possible to repeat the same aggregation
type immediately, for example a PP configuration consists
of 4 elements in parallel.
Several examples are shown in Figure 12. All systems de-
fined by this notation are highly regular and symmetrical,
which simplifies the analysis considerably. Following the no-
tation from Section 3, the cumulative force capability of a
configuration x is denoted with Rfx(cf ), and the cumulative
travel capability with Rtx(ct). This allows an easy compar-
ison between different configurations. In the following, all
elements are assumed to be identical as specified using the
properties defined in Section 2.
4.2. Iterative Reliability Calculation. In each iterative
step, two subsystems with a known reliability distribution
are combined to a new system. The configuration of a sub-
system is assumed to be x, and the cumulative force and
travel reliability distributions are Rfx(cf ) and Rtx(ct).
For a parallel configuration (xP) of two subsystems x1
and x2, the force increases (cf1+ cf2), and the travel is lim-
ited by the weaker subsystem (min{ct1, ct2}). As discussed
in Section 3, the following two operators can be used to
calculate the cumulative reliability distributions.
Theorem 3. The cumulative reliability distributions for a
system of two nominally identical parallel subsystems are
RfxP = Rfx ⊕Rfx(22)
RtxP = Rtx ~Rtx .(23)
Similarly, in a series configuration (xS), the force is lim-
ited by the weakest element (min{cf1, cf2}), and the travel
increases (ct1 + ct2). So the cumulative reliability distribu-
tions are determined by the other operator, respectively.
Theorem 4. The cumulative reliability distributions for a
system of two nominally identical subsystems in series are
RfxS = Rfx ~Rfx(24)
RtxS = Rtx ⊕Rtx .(25)
Proof. The proofs for these two theorems are analogue to
the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 in Section 3. Instead of the
two individual elements assumed there, two identical sub-
systems specified by Rfx and Rtx are used. These subsys-
tems satisfy all the assumptions made about the elements,
including the independence. 
By using these four equations iteratively, the reliability
distributions of arbitrarily complex configurations can be
determined in a straightforward way.
4.3. Reliability Order. It is obvious that some configu-
rations are more reliable than others, even for the same
overall size. The following findings will demonstrate this
for the case of force reliability Rf , and the case for travel
reliability is analogue but inverted.
The fundamental operation is the exchange of an SP con-
figuration for a PS configuration. As shown in Figure 5, this
means the introduction of the cross link in the centre where
all four elements come together. Intuitively, this can only
increase the reliability of the system.
Lemma 1. Exchanging an SP aggregation for a PS aggre-
gation enhances the force reliability:
(26) RfxPSy(c) ≥ RfxSPy(c) .
Proof. The proof is possible by looking at the reliability dis-
tributions, but it is much easier on the level of capabilities.
If c1 to c4 are the capability of the four subsystem with
configuration x, the capability of the xPS configuration
cxPS = max(c1 + c2, c3 + c4)
and the capability of the xSP configuration is
cxSP = max(c1, c3) + max(c2, c4) .
It follows that for all ci ≥ 0
cxSP ≥ cxPS .
Due to the monotonicity of capability aggregation, this also
holds for the comparison of the full systems
cxSPy ≥ cxPSy .
So for every possible fault combination, the configuration
xSPy is at least as strong as the configuration xPSy, and
therefore the capability distribution will satisfy the relation
(28). 
This lemma 1 directly leads to a more general theorem for
interchanging S and P aggregation for non-adjacent layers.
Theorem 5. Exchanging an earlier (small subsystem) S
aggregation with a later (bigger subsystem) P aggregation
enhances the force reliability:
(27) RfxPySz(c) ≥ RfxSyPz(c) .
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Proof. This can be shown by repeatedly applying the lemma
above. For this purpose, the first S in y is moved to the
front by repeatedly applying the lemma, then the next S is
moved in its place etc., until the S after y can be moved
into y, leaving a P in its place. In total |y| + 1 operations
are necessary, where |y| is the length of y. 
The same conclusion can be found for the travel reliabil-
ity, except that the effect is the opposite:
Theorem 6. Exchanging an earlier (small subsystem) S
aggregation with a later (bigger subsystem) P aggregation
reduces the travel reliability:
(28) RtxPySz(c) ≤ RtxSyPz(c) .
the proof is analogue to above. Both theorems together
demonstrate that selecting the best configuration is a trade-
off between robustness towards loose faults and robustness
towards lock-up faults.
5. Approximation of Elements With Exclusive
Error Modes
The proposed independent analysis of both fault modes
is only valid under the assumption that the fault modes are
independent of each other. For many practical applications,
the fault modes are exclusive and therefore not independent,
and it is important to consider the error introduced by this
assumption of independence. The case of both fault modes
being present in an element is assumed to be qfqt, but in
reality it is 0. There are two principle ways to deal with this
discrepancy: on the element level and on the system level.
5.1. Adjustment of Element Probabilities. On the el-
ement level, the key problem is that the probability of the
fault-free case is (see Table 1)
P (Fault=None) = (1− qf )(1− qt) = 1− qf − qt + qfqt
whereas the correct (lower) value is
1− qf − qt .
The error qfqt is exactly the probability of the combined
fault case.
P (Fault=Both) = qfqt .
The proposed solution to avoid this is to add the error to
one of the fault probabilities. For example the force error
probability can be increased to
q′f =
qf
1− qt
which leads to the correct fault-free probability
P (Fault=None) = (1− q′f )(1− qt) = 1− qf − qt .
The likelihood of a loose fault is overestimated by these, and
this leads to a slightly inaccurate but conservative reliability
result. The downside of this approach is that the size of
the error on the end result is not known (unless a separate
calculation is performed without the adjustment).
5.2. Adjustment of Aggregated Reliability. Alterna-
tively a second option can be pursued: it leaves the element
fault probabilities unchanged and adjusts the reliability re-
sulting from the aggregation instead to make it conserva-
tive. The underlying assumption in this case is that both
fault modes are exclusive, both for the elements and for the
aggregated system.
For the element specification, this leads to three distinct
cases:
P (Fault=None) = 1− qf − qt
P (Fault=Loose) = qf
P (Fault=Locked) = qt .
These are exact probabilities.
For the results of the aggregated system, this assump-
tion of exclusivity is not strictly true, because a specific
combination of locked and loose elements could lower both
capabilities below the requirements, even if each element
exhibits only one failure mode.
While the probabilities of meeting (or not) either capa-
bility are known exactly (Rfx and Rtx), the overlap between
the two cases is not known. If both fault modes were com-
pletely independent as assumed above, the probability of
both being present could be calculated as (1−Rfx)(1−Rtx).
Since both fault modes are exclusive on the element level,
the probability for this combined fault mode has to be lower.
The exact value can only be found using a much more in-
volving two dimensional analysis.
By using (1 − Rfx)(1 − Rtx) as an upper and 0 as a
lower bound, the following bounds can be found for the
final system reliability:
Rftx(cf , ct) ≥ 1− (1−Rfx(cf )− (1−Rtx(ct))
= Rfx(cf ) +Rtx(ct)− 1
Rftx(cf , ct) ≤ Rfx(cf )Rtx(ct)
This is based on conservative assumptions only, and there-
fore the true value is known be within the bounds. The key
advantage of this method is that two bounds are given, and
makes it possible to quantify the error made by dealing with
both fault modes independently.
6. Example Configurations
Some representative examples of series-parallel configu-
rations will be discussed in this section. The first two sys-
tems are two level arrangements (called series in parallel
and parallel in series), as shown in Figures 5c and 5d. Later
the analysis is extended to all 4× 4 configurations.
6.1. Force Capability of Series in Parallel. The first
example consists of two series elements, duplicated in par-
allel. This configuration is called series in parallel or SP for
short. It consists of two serial elements on the left (upper
left 1.1 and lower left 2.1), and two corresponding serial el-
ements on the right (upper right 1.2 and lower right 2.2).
The system reliability is analysed for the capability to gen-
erate the force of a single element, and the resulting fault
tree is shown in Figure 6.
Let the force capabilities or states of the left column be
cf11 and cf21, and the capabilities on the right cf12 and
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(a) SP configuration (b) PS configuration
Figure 6. Fault Tree for a Force Require-
ment of 1
cf22. All elements have the same force reliability pf . The
force capability of the system is
cfSP(cf ) = cf left + cfright(29)
= min{cf11, cf21}+min{cf12, cf22} .(30)
Following the bottom up approach, the cumulative reliabil-
ity distribution RfS(c) for a single column of two elements
in series needs to be determined first. According to Eqn. (6),
the operator ~ is required
RfS = Rf ~Rf ,
and it leads to the result
RfS(0) = 1(31)
RfS(1) = p
2
f = 1− 2qf + q2f .(32)
The computation of these reliabilities is much easier from
a numerical perspective if they are expressed in terms of q.
Therefore, polynomials in qf will be used to describe them
here.
This reliability distribution RfS is used to describe the
two columnar subsystems that compose the whole system.
This case is particularly simple, because the subsystems are
still binary (with capabilities of 0 and 1 only). Eqn. (20)
can be used for the parallel arrangement of subsystems with
the operator ⊕:
RfSP = RfS ⊕RfS
The resulting capability distribution is:
RfSP(cf ) = RfS ⊕RfS(33)
= rfS(0)
2−cf − rfS(1)cf
(
2
cf
)
(34)
= (1− p2f )2−cf p2cff
(
2
cf
)
(35)
or as polynomials
RfSP(0) = 1(36)
RfSP(1) = 1− 4q2f + 4q3f − q4f(37)
RfSP(2) = 1− 4qf + 6q2f − 4q3f + q4f .(38)
Under the simplifying assumption qf  pf , this can be
approximated as
RfSP(cf ) ≈ 1− (2qf )2−cf
(
2
cf
)
.(39)
6.2. Force Capability of Parallel in Series. The second
example looks at the dual assembly: two elements are used
in parallel, and two of these blocks are arranged in series.
The only difference to the previous assembly is the addition
of the cross connection at the middle of the actuator. Now
the system can be divided into a top group and a bottom
group. The force adds up in each group, but the force capa-
bility of the overall system is limited by the weakest group.
This leads to the capability function
cfSP(cf ) = min{cftop, cfbottom}(40)
= min{cf11 + cf12, cf21 + cf22} .(41)
For each group of two parallel elements, the Eqn. (20) ap-
plies. It leads to
RfP(cf ) = Rf
=
2∑
i=cf
q2−if p
i
f
(
2
i
)
.
Expanding the resulting polynomials produces
RfP(0) = 1
RfP(1) = 1− q2f
RfP(2) = 1− 2qf + q2f
RfP(3) = 0 .
The second step of the analysis is more complicated, because
each group is now a multi-state system with three distinct
capabilities. Consequently, the simple solution from Eqns.
(10) and (11) cannot be used. Eqn. (24) has to be applied,
which uses the operator ~ as defined in Eqn. (5). This leads
to
RfPS = RfP ~RfP(42)
or
RfPS(cf ) = R
2
fP(cf )(43)
This leads to the polynomial solution
RfPS(0) = 1(44)
RfPS(1) = 1− 2q2f + q4f(45)
RfPS(2) = 1− 4qf + 6q2f − 4q3f + q4f .(46)
The resulting equation (43) can also be simplified using the
assumption qf  pf to the approximation
RfPS(cf ) ≈ 1− 2q2−cff
(
2
cf − 1
)
.
The difference between both structures is found by com-
paring Eqn. (37) with Eqn. (45), as shown in Figure 7. All
other reliability values are identical, but RfSP(1) 6= RfPS(1)
shows a noticeable difference. The parallel in series struc-
ture is superior by nearly a factor of two for low fault prob-
abilities qf .
The reason becomes obvious when multiple faults are
classified into fatal ones (leading to a force capability of 0)
and non-fatal ones (maintaining a force capability of 1). A
multiple fault is fatal if it involves several elements that are
working in parallel. Assuming that one fault has already oc-
curred, it is interesting to analyse which further fault would
be fatal. In the PS structure, this is only the one element
directly in parallel, while a further fault in either element of
the other serial group has no effect on the force capability.
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Figure 7. Reliability Rfx(1) of 2× 2 Configurations
However, in the SP structure, there are always two elements
in parallel to the faulty element. A second fault in either of
these reduces the force capability to 0.
6.3. Extension to Higher Sizes. The same considera-
tions can be applied to any assembly that follows a series
in parallel or parallel in series structure. A square system
of n columns and m rows is a natural extension of the 2× 2
arrangement considered above.
For the parallel in series system, the overall force capa-
bility is found to be
cfPS(cf ) =
m
min
i=1
n∑
j=1
cf,ij .(47)
The general form of the reliability is
RfPS(cf ) =
 n∑
i=cf
(1− qf )n−iqif
(
n
i
)m(48)
=
1− cf−1∑
i=0
(1− qf )n−iqif
(
n
i
)m ,(49)
and a reasonable first order approximation is given by
RfPS(cf ) ≈ 1−mqn−cf+1f
(
n
cf − 1
)
.
In a similar way, the overall force capability of a series in
parallel system is
cfSP(cf ) =
n∑
j=1
m
min
i=1
cf,ij .(50)
This leads to a reliability function of
rfSP(cf )=(1− (1− qf )m)n−cf (1− qf )mcf
(
n
cf
)
,
and a first order approximation of
RfSP(cf ) ≈ 1− (mqf )n−cf+1
(
n
cf − 1
)
.
So the PS configuration is generally superior for when the
force is relevant, and the SP configuration is superior for
providing a required amount of travel or velocity. The dif-
ference between both configurations increases significantly
Figure 8. Hierarchy of the SPSP Configuration
as the requirements are reduced or the number of elements
is increased.
When the travel or velocity is considered, the roles are
interchanged between the SP and the PS configuration (and
of course qf is then the failure probability for lock-up faults):
RtPS(ct) ≈ 1− (mqt)n−ct+1
(
n
ct − 1
)
RtSP(ct) ≈ 1−mqn−ct+1f
(
n
ct − 1
)
.
These equations together can also be used to find the
ideal size (n ×m) of an HRA. The four design parameters
are the two numbers n,m representing the size as well as the
required force capabilities cf and ct (determining the degree
of redundancy). The strength required for each element can
be calculated from these, as can the probability of an HRA
failure due to force or travel capabilities below the require-
ments. Assuming that elements of any strength (force and
travel) can be used, these four parameters are the main way
of adjusting the reliability of the HRA, while minimising
cost and weight. And even if the nominal strength is fixed,
it is still possible to tune the number of essential elements
required to deliver the capability (and therefore the number
of redundant elements) to suit the reliability requirements.
6.4. 4×4 Multi-Level Hierarchical Configurations. A
central aim of this paper is the analysis of hierarchical con-
figurations with more than two levels, because they offer
potentially superior overall reliability due to a better bal-
ance of fault modes. A simplifying assumption here is that
each level combines two identical subsystems. Any 4 × 4
configuration therefore consists of four levels, two of which
are series connections, while the other two parallel connec-
tions - the only difference is the order of aggregation. All
six possible configurations are shown in Figure 12.
In the nominal state, all configurations are identical: both
force and travel capability are four times the value of a single
element. However, the response to faults differs significantly
because of the existence or absence of lateral connections.
The use of fault trees for analysis an HRA leads to a
number of issues. For the SSPP or PPSS configurations, it
is possible to perform this analysis with a reasonably con-
cise fault tree by introducing the (non-standard) k-out-of-n
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Figure 9. Fault Tree for the SSPP Configuration
Figure 10. Fault Tree for the SPSP Configuration
gate as shown in Figure 9. The analysis of mixed config-
uration such as SPSP (see Figure 8) is more complicated,
although it already uses shared signals subtrees to reduce
the size. This means it is technically no longer a tree, and
the number of cut sets can be much larger than the tree
suggests. The basic problem is that most fault tree based
methods cannot utilise the highly symmetrical structure to
avoid repeated computation of symmetric subsystems. Our
analysis also shows that two typical approximations are no
longer justified: cut sets of more than the minimum size
have to be considered because of their large number, and
the probability of unaffected elements to be not at fault
cannot be approximated as 1 without significant errors. All
these issues mean that fault trees with binary signals are
not a convenient way of analysing such systems.
A very simple graphical representation can be achieved
by following the multi-state view of the system. The oper-
ators ~ and ⊕ introduced above in Eqns. (22) and (24) are
used to describe the structure of the system. The resulting
tree in Figure 11 could be interpreted as an extended fault
tree, but it is important to realise that the connections do
not represent events (binary variables), but the capability
of a subsystem. Classical fault tree analysis is not able to
deal with these, while a multi-state systems approach can.
F2.1C1.1
 
Left Half Capability
F2.2C1.2 F4.1C3.1 F4.2C3.2 F2.3C1.3 F2.4C1.4 F4.3C3.3 F4.4C3.4
Right Half Capability
HRA 
Force 
Cap. < 3
< 3
Total Capability
* * * * * * * *
* *
Figure 11. Fault Tree for the SPSP Con-
figuration Using Multi-State Signals
(a) SSPP (b) SPSP (c) PSSP
(d) SPPS (e) PSPS (f) PPSS
Figure 12. All Symmetrical Series-
Parallel 4× 4 Configurations
The same analysis is applied to all six configurations.
Because of the textual length of the results, the two function
are implemented in MATLAB using the symbolic toolbox.
The reliability of a (sub)system is denoted using a vector
Rf = (Rf (0) Rf (1) Rf (2) · · · Rf (n))T
of variable size, and the individual entries are polynomials
in qf .
2 The results are shortened by giving only the two
relevant elements of this vector, and by omitting coefficients
of little interest:
2The MATLAB symbolic toolbox has been used for the automatic
manipulation of these polynomials. While MATLAB supports native
functions for manipulating polynomials, these operate on vectors, and
not first class polynomial objects. This makes it more difficult to
represent the capability distributions.
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RfSSPP(3) = 1− 24q2f + 32q3f + 204q4f . . .+ 81q16f
RfSPSP(3) = 1− 40q2f + 128q3f + 220q4f . . .+ q16f
RfPSSP(3) = 1− 48q2f + 176q3f + 276q4f . . .+ 9q16f
RfSPPS(3) = 1− 72q2f + 512q3f − 1892q4f . . .+ q16f
RfPSPS(3) = 1− 80q2f + 592q3f − 2228q4f . . .+ q16f
RfPPSS(3) = 1− 96q2f + 800q3f − 3480q4f . . .− 3q16f ,
and
RfSSPP(2) = 1− 16q3f + 12q4f + 96q6f . . .+ 81q16f
RfSPSP(2) = 1− 32q3f + 56q4f − 16q5f . . .+ q16f
RfPSSP(2) = 1− 64q3f + 192q4f − 240q5f . . .+ 9q16f
RfSPPS(2) = 1− 64q3f + 240q4f − 352q5f . . .− q16f
RfPSPS(2) = 1− 128q3f + 640q4f − 1248q5f . . .− q16f
RfPPSS(2) = 1− 256q3f + 1920q4f − 7104q5f . . .+ 3q16f .
The results for 1−Rf (3) (allowing one effective element
fault) are plotted over the element fault probability qf in
Figure 13 on a linear scale. Note that the most interest-
ing part is the area of low fault probability (close to 0) and
high system reliability (close to 1), therefore the system
unreliability 1−R is shown. To highlight very small values,
the same data is shown on a logarithmic scale in Figure 14.
For comparison, the unreliability 1 − Rf (2) (up to two ef-
fective element faults) is plotted in Figure 15. A number of
observations are interesting from the point of high redun-
dancy actuation.
(1) All reliability functions have the same polynomial
structure: they start at 1, the first non-constant
term is a factor of q2f for Rf (2) and q
3
f for Rf (3),
and they contain higher order terms up to q16f . This
is a consequence of the basic requirements, which
can be fulfilled in every configuration with zero or
one faulty element.
(2) The reliabilities maintain a strict order over the con-
figuration
RfSSPP(3) > RfSPSP(3) > RfPSSP(3)
> RfSPPS(3) > RfPSPS(3) > RfPPSS(3)
for all 0 < qf < 1. So looking only at the force, some
configurations are better than others, independent
of the parameters. Rf (2) only follows a partial or-
der, because the relation between RfPSSP(2) and
RfSPPS(2) depends on qf .
(3) The reliability of travel (Rt(3) and Rt(2)) follows
the opposite order,
RtSSPP(3) < RtSPSP(3) < RtPSSP(3)
< RtSPPS(3) < RtPSPS(3) < RtPPSS(3)
for all qt because of the correspondence RfSSPP =
RtPPSS (for corresponding qt = qf ) etc. So the con-
flict between reliable force and reliable travel is con-
firmed consistently.
Based on these results, it is possible to calculate the failure
probability due to insufficient force and travel, and then
select the best configuration for given reliability values qt
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Figure 13. Unreliability 1−Rfx(3) of 4× 4 Configurations
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Figure 14. Unreliability 1 − Rfx(3) on a
Logarithmic Scale
and qf . Depending on the exact circumstances, any of the
6 configurations may be optimal.
6.5. Results Over Time. Because the analysis so far is
based on probabilities, time has not been considered. This
can be changed by making the fault probability of each el-
ement time dependent. Example results are shown in Fig-
ure 16. The assumption is that each element fails with a
constant rate of 1 fault every τ second (shown by the refer-
ence line), leading to qf (t) = 1− e−t/τ . Inserting this func-
tion into the polynomial Rfx(3) leads to a combination of
exponential functions describing the system reliability over
time. The reliability of a single element (1 − qf ) is also
shown in the figure as 1× 1 for comparison.
The advantage of this approach over methods working di-
rectly in the time domain (such as stochastic automatons) is
the computational complexity. By calculating this result in
two steps, the complexity of the time domain simulation is
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Figure 15. Unreliability 1 − Rfx(2) on a
Logarithmic Scale
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Figure 16. Unreliability 1−Rfx(2) Over Time
minimal, because it only involves one element. The calcula-
tion of the system reliability is based on the approach shown
above, and also bears a low computational complexity.
This separation is possible, because it is assumed that
for the fault behaviour, the elements can be considered in-
dependent of each other. Even if this assumption is not
exactly met, it is possible to work with a conservative ap-
proximation.
7. Selecting the Best Configuration
The original goal was to find the best configuration for
a given task, and this section will show how the results can
be used to compare different candidates and to identify the
best one. Since there is a trade-off between robustness to-
wards loss of force and robustness towards loss of travel, it is
important to remember that both were treated separately
only to simplify the analysis. Usually a system would be
specified with a force requirement cf and a travel require-
ment ct. Both have to be met for a functional system. As
long as both faults occur independently of each other, the
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Figure 17. Comparison of Overall Relia-
bility Rx(2, 2) = 0.99
reliabilities can be multiplied to
Rftx(cf , ct) = Rfx(cf )Rtx(ct) .
However, since both faults are mutually exclusive in a single
element, they are not completely independent. Therefore a
safe (conservative) approximation is
Rftx(cf , ct) ≥ Rfx(cf ) +Rtx(ct)− 1 ,
which also has the advantage of producing less complex re-
sults.
For example the SSPP configuration leads to
RftSSPP(2, 2) ≥ RfSSPP(cf ) +RtSSPP(ct)− 1
= 1− 16q3f + 12q4f + 96q6f . . .+ 81q16f
−256q3t + 1920q4t − 7104q5t . . .+ 3q16t .
The dual configuration PPSS leads to a very similar result
RPPSS, but the places of qf and qt are interchanged. If only
the highest order of q is considered, the following approxi-
mations are found:
RftSSPP(2, 2) ≥ 1− 16q3f − 256q3t
RftSPSP(2, 2) ≥ 1− 32q3f − 128q3t
RftPSSP(2, 2) ≥ 1− 64q3f − 64q3t
RftSPPS(2, 2) ≥ 1− 64q3f − 64q3t
RftPSPS(2, 2) ≥ 1− 128q3f − 32q3t
RftPPSS(2, 2) ≥ 1− 256q3f − 16q3t .
It depends on the ratio of q3f : q
3
t which value is the highest,
and therefore which configuration provides the best relia-
bility. This is graphically demonstrated in Figure 17. The
lines denote combinations of q3f and q
3
t that lead to the same
overall reliability of 99%. The further right and up the line
goes, the better the reliability of the configuration, as the
system is less sensitive to the element faults. The different
slopes represent different sensitivity to the two fault modes.
The Pareto optimal solution contains parts of all five lines,
which means that each configuration is the best choice for
a certain ratio qf : qt between the two fault modes. (This
also holds for the exact reliabilities of the PSSP and SPPS
configuration, although it is not obvious from the approxi-
mations used here.)
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8. Computational Complexity
The main advantage of this approach is the very low
computational complexity, compared to other methods that
get prohibitively expensive even for moderate configuration
sizes. This section will discuss the complexity in a bit more
detail. Assuming a square configuration, the number of co-
operating elements shall be n1, and the number of limiting
elements shall be n2, giving a total of n1n2 elements. The
maximum capability in the system is given by n1. It is fur-
ther assumed that the structure is highly symmetric (as in
the examples), and it follows that both n1 and n2 are powers
of 2.
Each basic aggregation operation (as detailed in Theo-
rems 6 and 7 using ~ and ⊕) can be performed in a linear
number of basic arithmetic operations, depending on the
maximum capability, so it is of complexity order O(n1). Due
to the symmetric nature of the structure, each aggregation
doubles the number of considered elements, so the number
of required aggregations from a single element to the whole
system is the dual logarithm of n1n2 or log2(n1n2). This
leads to an overall complexity of O(n1 log2 n1n2) for deter-
mining the system reliability from a given set of fault prob-
abilities. This complexity is so low that the computation
can be performed many times to test different fault proba-
bilities or configurations. Even systems of size 1000× 1000
or more are still fast to analyse.
Structures without symmetries or broken symmetries would
require further computations up to an order of O(n1n1n2).
While this is still a low polynomial complexity, there is very
little to gain from breaking the symmetry, and the num-
ber of configurations to analyse may explode exponentially.
Hence it is not generally recommended.
Traditional methods have a much higher complexity which
applied to the HRA, because a large number of faults has to
be considered. Without optimisations, a fault tree analysis
of the HRA involves O(2n1n2) combinations, which is pro-
hibitive even for reasonably small systems such an 8×8 grid.
Some optimisations are possible, but they do not avoid the
basic problem of exponential complexity, which prevents the
analysis of larger systems.
An event tree analysis would look at faults in the order
of occurance. While this does increase the number of poten-
tial combinations, it also allows the elimination of significant
parts of the event tree once the required capabilities are not
longer met, since the order of faults is known. The resulting
computational complexity is difficult to predict, because the
number of faults that can be accommodated varies by fault
location. It is bounded by n′1 and n
′
1n2, where n
′
1 is the
number of cooperating elements required. This means the
computational complexity is between O
(
(n1n2)!
(n1n2−n′1)!
)
and
O
(
(n1n2)!
((n1−n′1)n2)!
)
, although further optimisations are possi-
ble in symmetric configurations. So this approach can be
faster than the fault tree when the requirements are a sig-
nificant part of the maximum capability. Again, it seems
possible to study medium sized systems such as 8× 8 with
high capability requirements (≥ 6), but it quickly becomes
prohibitively expensive above this number.
The conclusion is that the presented approach offers radi-
cally lower computational complexity than the alternatives,
combined with a very simple implementation. This makes
it especially suitable for the early design states, where the
size of elements and their configuration is studied. Other,
more accurate methods may still be useful for verification
purposes.
9. Conclusions
This document has shown how to calculate the reliability
of an HRA. Due to the high number of actuation elements,
a new generic approach had to be developed. Using prob-
ability distributions, the problem can be solved with a low
computational effort and using well understood operations.
This is achieved by using a number of abstractions and ap-
proximating assumptions.
Different configurations consisting of several levels of se-
ries and parallel connections are considered and modelled
using multi-state systems. Due to the approximations, the
results may not represent the system in all detail, but they
are still helpful for a sensible comparison between HRA de-
signs. The results show that even with the same number of
elements in the same two dimensional arrangement, the se-
lection of the best suitable configuration (as determined by
the lateral connections) has a significant influence on the re-
liability of the HRA. The influence is especially pronounced
when high element fault rates have to be considered, as it
is planned for the HRA.
The general concept of dual capabilities presented here
is not restricted to actuation problems. It can be used in
any domain where systems are used in parallel and serial
arrangements to increase capabilities. This includes high
power electronic switching devices, to transport networks
and to communications systems. As long as the system can
be interpreted as a hierarchy of series and parallel connec-
tions, and the independence requirements are satisfied, it
is possible to analyse the reliability using the given opera-
tions on capability distributions. It would be interesting to
pursue such an application to a different domain.
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